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ABSTRACT
A recent normative turn in computer science has brought concerns
about fairness, bias, and accountability to the core of the field. Yet
recent scholarship has warned that much of this technical work
treats problematic features of the status quo as fixed, and fails to
address deeper patterns of injustice and inequality. While acknowl-
edging these critiques, we posit that computational research has
valuable roles to play in addressing social problems — roles whose
value can be recognized even from a perspective that aspires toward
fundamental social change. In this paper, we articulate four such
roles, through an analysis that considers the opportunities as well
as the significant risks inherent in such work. Computing research
can serve as a diagnostic, helping us to understand and measure so-
cial problems with precision and clarity. As a formalizer, computing
shapes how social problems are explicitly defined — changing how
those problems, and possible responses to them, are understood.
Computing serves as rebuttal when it illuminates the boundaries
of what is possible through technical means. And computing acts
as synecdoche when it makes long-standing social problems newly
salient in the public eye. We offer these paths forward as modalities
that leverage the particular strengths of computational work in
the service of social change, without overclaiming computing’s
capacity to solve social problems on its own.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics→ Computing / technology pol-
icy; • Applied computing→ Computers in other domains.
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social change, inequality, discrimination, societal implications of
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1 INTRODUCTION
In high-stakes decision-making, algorithmic systems have the po-
tential to predict outcomes more accurately and to allocate scarce
societal resources more efficiently — but also the potential to intro-
duce, perpetuate, and worsen inequality. Algorithmic accountabil-
ity, fairness, and bias have quickly become watchwords of main-
stream technical research and practice, gaining currency both in
computer science scholarship and in technology companies. And
these concerns are having a public moment, with policymakers and
practitioners newly attuned to their import.
Recently, these concerns have sparked debate about the relation-
ship between computing and social change— in particular, about the
degree to which technical interventions can address fundamental
problems of justice and equity. Scholars have recently raised con-
cerns about taking a computational lens to certain social problems,
questioning whether modifications to automated decision-making
can ever address the structural conditions that relegate certain so-
cial groups to the margins of society [19, 31, 37, 41, 45, 49]. On
these accounts, realizing principles of justice and equity requires
addressing the root social, economic, and political origins of these
problems — not optimizing around them [9, 14, 30, 36, 44, 50, 55,
74, 77, 80, 88, 92].
This debate has happened against the backdrop of a long his-
tory of critical reflection on the values embodied in technical ar-
tifacts, and the need to design with such values in mind. Scholars
have spent decades working to draw attention to the normative
commitments expressed in and through technology. This call for
recognition of values has been a core project of science and tech-
nology studies [6, 58, 93], Values-in-Design [42, 57], legal scholar-
ship [27, 67, 84], and allied disciplines for years, and remains an
active area of research. Algorithms have become objects of particu-
lar scrutiny over the past decade [48].
Within computer science, the machine learning and mechanism
design communities have been particularly active in taking up these
concerns. Both fields have been heeding the call for attention to
values, politics, and “social good” more generally, holding more
than twenty technical workshops and conferences between them
on some variation of fairness, bias, discrimination, accountability,
and transparency in the last five years (e.g., [1, 40]).
And yet, these recent efforts have been met with concern that
computer science has failed to target the right point of intervention.
In focusing on changes to decision-making and allocation, these
endeavors risk obscuring the background conditions that sustain
injustices. For instance, a computational intervention that aims to
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equalize offers of college admission across demographic groups
might function as a less ambitious substitute for the deeper and
more challenging work of improving high school instruction in low-
income neighborhoods. Similarly, an intervention at the selection
phase in an employment context might mask the impact of a hostile
workplace culture or other barriers to long-term employee suc-
cess — problems for which other (and perhaps non-technological)
responses might be indicated [10].
There is a long-standing tension between strategies that seek to
intervene incrementally within the contours of an existing social
and political system and those that seek more wholesale social and
political reform. Existing work has made clear how computational
approaches may contribute to the former style of intervention. Here,
we ask whether, and to what extent, computing can contribute to
the latter style as well. We pose this question while recognizing the
critical scholarship we have described above, and we emphatically
reject the idea that technological interventions can unilaterally
“solve” injustice in society — an approach some critics condemn as
“solutionism” [72]. Our goal is to cut a path between solutionist and
critical perspectives by describing potential roles through which
computing work can support, rather than supplant, other ways of
understanding and addressing social problems.
Meaningful advancement toward social change is always the
work of many hands. We explore where and how technical ap-
proaches might be part of the solution, and how we might exploit
their unique properties as a route to broader reforms. In this way,
we seek to address two distinct audiences: this paper is a call to
our colleagues in computer science to reflect on how we go about
our work in this area, as well as a response to our fellow critical
scholars who question computing’s value in addressing social prob-
lems. In what follows, we propose a series of four potential roles
for computing research that may be well-aligned with efforts for
broader social change.1
The roles we offer here are intentionally modest: they are ways
to leverage the particular attributes of computational work without
overclaiming its capacity. We argue that these are worthy and
plausible aspirations for our nascent field. Our list is illustrative,
not exhaustive, and our categories are not mutually exclusive. And
like any attempt to effectuate change, the approaches we outline
carry hazards of their own, which we also explore below.2
2 COMPUTING AS DIAGNOSTIC
Computing can help us measure social problems and diagnose how
they manifest in technical systems.
While computing cannot solve social problems on its own, its
methods can be used to diagnose and precisely characterize those
problems. Computational approaches, used in tandem with other
empirical methods, can provide crucial evidentiary support for
work that attends to values in technology — even if computing
1These proposals are in the spirit of other scholars’ recent calls to recognize the
political nature of computational work and articulate new modes of engagement for
computing (e.g., [49]).
2While we include some examples from low- and middle-income nations, many of
the examples and hence discussions are focused around the United States and other
developed nations. There is an emerging set of discussions around risks and challenges
in using machine learning specifically in the context of developing nations, including
the annual Machine Learning for Development Workshop Series [34], which also faces
many of the structural challenges we engage here.
itself is an insufficient remedy. In this sense, there is a role for
computer science and its methods to play in critically interrogating
computing itself.
Many now-classic studies in the field take this approach, giving
us a new sense of the shape and depth of a long-standing problem
by applying a computational lens. Latanya Sweeney’s analysis of
an ad delivery platform demonstrated, among other things, that
arrest-related ads weremore likely to appear in response to searches
for first names commonly associated with African-Americans [90],
likely reflecting Internet users’ disproportionate propensity to click
on ads suggesting that African-Americans, rather than people of
other races, have criminal records. Teams of computer science re-
searchers have demonstrated the gender biases inherent in word
embeddings and the difficulties they create for machine transla-
tion and other language tasks [17, 21]. More recently, Joy Buo-
lamwini and Timnit Gebru demonstrated that several commercially
available facial analysis systems perform significantly worse on
women and individuals with darker skin tones [20]. These analyses
have enhanced our ability to document discriminatory patterns in
particular sociotechnical systems, showing the depth, scope, and
pervasiveness of such problems and illuminating the mechanisms
through which they occur.
And yet, while these studies sometimes point toward improve-
ments that could be made (e.g., to ensure that ads appear at com-
parable rates across groups, to use caution with language models
trained on text corpora with ingrained human biases, or to train
facial analysis systems on a more diverse dataset), they do not pur-
port to offer computational solutions to the problems they illustrate.
From this perspective, recent attempts to develop formal defini-
tions of fairness, while often presented as a solution to bias, can
be understood as diagnostics first and foremost — as new meth-
ods and metrics for evaluating normatively relevant properties of
computational systems [11, Chapter 2].
Diagnostic work of this sort can be particularly valuable when
confronting systems that are “black-boxed”: when the criteria of
decision-making (and the values that inhere therein) are obscured
by complexity, trade secret, or lack of transparency, diagnostic
studies can provide an important means of auditing technical pro-
cesses [87]. And such an approach can help to highlight technolog-
ical dimensions of a social problem in a way that would be difficult
to interrogate otherwise. For example, Abebe et al. leverage search
data to surface unmet health information needs across the African
continent — demonstrating when and how search engines display
low-quality health information to users. A lack of high-authority
websites relevant to users’ search queries might mean that results
highlight natural cures for HIV, rather than scientifically sound
medical advice [2].
Other recent work has sought to advance the diagnostic role that
computing can play by providing a principled approach to inter-
rogating the machine learning pipeline [46, 71]. These diagnostic
efforts do not present themselves as solutions, but rather as tools to
rigorously document practices. Thus, when compared with other
computing interventions that aim directly at incremental improve-
ments, they are less vulnerable to becoming a substitute for broader
change. These efforts are not intended to absolve practitioners of
the responsibility to critically examine the system in question, but
instead to aid in that investigation.
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Without purporting to resolve underlying social problems, diag-
nostic studies that use computational techniques can nevertheless
drive real-world impacts on the systems they investigate. For exam-
ple, in response to Buolamwini and Gebru’s findings [20], Microsoft
and IBM reported that they had improved the accuracy of their fa-
cial analysis technologies along gender and racial lines [81, 85].
Continued research (e.g., [83]) and advocacy following this work
has led to policy-making and government action that questions,
limits, or prohibits the use of facial recognition in a number of
contexts.
Some important caveats are warranted. First, computing is not
unique in its capacity to help us diagnose social problems, even
those manifest in technical systems. Disciplines like science and
technology studies (STS), sociology, and economics provide their
own sets of tools to interrogate sociotechnical phenomena — includ-
ing tools that capture important dimensions poorly addressed by
computational approaches. For example, descriptive ethnographic
research is essential for understanding how social and organiza-
tional practices intersect with technical systems to produce certain
outcomes (e.g., [18, 26]. Computing is only one of multiple ap-
proaches that should be brought to bear on the analysis — even
when it may appear that the system in question (e.g., facial recog-
nition technology) is primarily technical. A holistic analysis of a
sociotechnical system must draw from a wide range of disciplines
in order to comprehensively identify the issues at stake [32, 88].
Second, our optimism as to the potential benefits of computing
as diagnostic must be tempered by a healthy degree of skepticism.
Oncemetrics and formulae are used to characterize the performance
of a system, individuals and organizations often have incentives
to optimize towards those metrics in ways that distort their be-
havior, and corrupt the meaning of the metric. This process puts
any targeted metric at risk of becoming a less useful measure over
time — a phenomenon known as Goodhart’s Law [56] or Camp-
bell’s Law [22]. We can see this worry instantiated, for example,
in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 4/5ths rule.
The rule applies to employee selection procedures, and holds that
when the selection rate for one protected group is less than 80% of
that of another group, such a gap is strong evidence of proscribed
disparate impact. Initially intended as a guideline to aid in diagnosis
of potentially discriminatory practices, it has become a target in
itself for practitioners who strictly enforce the 4/5ths rule while
sometimes failing to consider other aspects of discrimination and
bias [82]. Thus, when using computational techniques as diagnostic
tools, care must be taken to prevent diagnostics from implicitly
becoming targets.
Diagnostic approaches may be stymied when technical systems
have been insulated from outside scrutiny [76]. For example, while
a number of studies have used computational methods to charac-
terize proprietary algorithms used in news curation [68], resume
search [24], and ad delivery [7, 33], their methodologies must work
around the constraints imposed by the institutions that operate
these systems. Moreover, some testing methods can be further
impeded by legal restrictions on researchers’ activities (e.g., the dis-
puted use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to attach criminal
penalties to audit methods that involve violating a website’s terms
of service [79]). In such cases, it can be infeasible to provide a fully
comprehensive or conclusive diagnosis.
Finally, it can be tempting to view diagnosis itself as a goal: pre-
cisely stating the problem, we might hope, will naturally lead to a
solution. Indeed, a good diagnosis can motivate the relevant parties
to work towards remedying the concerns it surfaces. The above
examples, and others that follow in subsequent sections, demon-
strate that illuminating a problem through technical examination
can lead to positive change. However, it is important not to con-
fuse diagnosis with treatment: there are a number of domains in
which we are well aware of the extent of the problem (e.g., mass
incarceration or homelessness), yet do not have sufficient will or
consensus to adequately address it. As Ruha Benjamin notes, the
production of audit data about a social problem must be accompa-
nied by narrative tools that help to drive change: “[d]ata, in short,
do not speak for themselves and don’t always change hearts and
minds or policy” [13].
3 COMPUTING AS FORMALIZER
Computing requires explicit specification of inputs and goals, and can
shape how social problems are understood.
People and institutions chargedwithmaking important decisions
often speak in general terms about what they are doing. A standard
that says that social workers must act in the “best interests of
the child,” for instance, or an employer’s stated intent to hire the
“most qualified applicant,” leave wide latitude for interpretation.
This vagueness is a double-edged sword. At its best, such broad
flexibility lets decision-makers consider factors that are specific
to a particular case or situation, and that could not be stated in
a rigid rule. Vagueness is also an important political tool: laws
are often worded broadly because no majority of legislators could
agree on a more specific plan. Yet an underspecified standard may
effectively delegate important choices to people and situations that
are less open to scrutiny and supervision, and where individual bias
may play a larger role. The relative merits of holistic and flexible
“standards” versus more rigid and consistent “rules” are a prominent
topic of debate among legal scholars [61].
Increasing the role of computing within high-stakes decisions
often moves decision-making away from generalized standards and
toward more explicitly specified, rule-based models [27]. A compu-
tational model of a problem is a statement about how that problem
should be understood. To build and use a model is to make, and
to promote as useful, a particular lens for understanding what the
problem is. The nature of computing is such that it requires explicit
choices about inputs, objectives, constraints, and assumptions in a
system. The job applicant who is ranked first by a statistical model
or other algorithm will not simply be the one holistically deemed
most qualified; she will be the one ranked first on the basis of dis-
crete numbers and specific rules. Those rules will reflect a range of
concrete judgments about how job performance should be defined,
measured, and forecasted.
This quality of computing is often bemoaned: Algorithms are
cold calculators that collapse nuance and execute their tasks in
ignorance of the histories and contexts that precede and surround
them [41, 73, 88]. But this same quality may also be a source of
political potential. Because they must be explicitly specified and
precisely formalized, algorithms may help to lay bare the stakes of
decision-making and may give people an opportunity to directly
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confront and contest the values these systems encode [62]. In the
best case, the need to disambiguate general policy aims may provide
a community with important touchpoints for democratic delibera-
tion within policy processes.
A model may be rigid in the way that it formalizes the struc-
ture of a problem, but the act of formalization is, paradoxically, a
creative one, and increasingly important to social and political out-
comes. In many settings where automated decision-making tools
are used, this creative process of designing a system is a potential
opportunity for non-technical stakeholders, including responsible
officials and members of the public, to hash out different ways
in which a problem might be understood. Questions in this vein
include: what is the specific predicted outcome that serves as the
basis for decision-making, and why was it chosen over competing
alternatives [78]? Which outcomes should be treated as indicia of
“good” job performance [12]? How much risk should be considered
“high” risk, meriting special treatment or attention from a court or
a social services agency [64]? The process of formalization requires
that someone make these decisions — and gives us the opportunity
to explicitly consider how we would like them to be made.
The formalism required to construct a mathematical model can
serve as an opportune site of contestation, a natural intermediate
target for advocacy. Transparency and accountability, moreover, are
themselves intermediate virtues: Advocates will most often pursue
these ends not out of an abstract interest in procedural questions,
but rather as a way to influence the substance of decisions that the
eventual algorithmwill reach. Calls for transparency, accountability,
and stakeholder participation — while crucial in their own right
— ultimately do not resolve matters of substantive policy debate.
These procedural values concern how rules are made, but leave
unaddressed what those rules should actually be. The process of
formalization can bring analytic clarity to policy debates by forcing
stakeholders to be more precise about their goals and objectives.
This observation may seem out of step with the widely recog-
nized risk that machine learned models may be so complex as to
defy understanding. It may be difficult to succinctly describe how
a model weighs different features or to provide a meaningful ex-
planation for such a weighing. But all models are surrounded by
technical and policy choices that are amenable to broad understand-
ing and debate. The choice of objective function, for instance, and
debates over which features to use as candidates for inclusion in the
eventual model, are frequently delicate and politically important
questions.
For example, using statistical models to assess people who have
been accused of crimes is a controversial and widespread prac-
tice. These tools are described as “risk assessment” tools, but the
probabilities that they actually forecast — such as the chance that
the accused person will miss a future appointment related to the
case — do not directly correspond to the narrow sense of “risk”
that is legally salient at a bail hearing, namely the risk that the
defendant will abscond from the jurisdiction or will violently harm
another person before a trial can be held [64]. In situations like
this, where the relevant risk is substantially narrower and more
serious than the risks actually being measured and predicted by an
algorithm, the algorithm effectively paints with too broad a brush,
stigmatizing the accused by implicitly exaggerating the hazard that
they pose [64]. Many failures to appear at a courtroom hearing
are traceable to anodyne causes like a lack of transportation, or
confusion about the time and place of the appointment. Formalizing
the problem in a way that conflates these risks — as some pretrial
instruments do — is a substantive and consequential decision, one
that here operates to the detriment of the accused. For this among
many other reasons, a broad coalition of more than a hundred civil
rights organizations, as well as a substantial and growing number
of technical experts on algorithms and criminal law, either oppose
the use of these instruments in the forms they currently take or
else have raised serious concerns about their use [66].
The debate over how to formalize pretrial risk — and over how
and indeed whether to use these instruments — is highly active at
the time of this writing. Some advocates and scholars have argued
that any feasible formalization of the problem, given the available
data, will have drawbacks so serious as to draw into question the
use of actuarial methods at all [39, 64, 66, 70]. For instance, differ-
ing base rates of arrest across racial groups may mean that any
feasible predictive system will amplify longstanding disparities by
over-predicting arrests among stigmatized minority groups. Other
activists, even while objecting to data-driven methods for these and
other reasons, are also seeking to generate new kinds of data for the
pretrial system to use, such as formalized and measurable evidence
of the community support available to an accused person [59]. The
inherent challenges of formally modelling this problem are driving
both changes to the models being used, and a reconsideration of
whether risk assessment should be used at all.
In another context, Abebe et al.’s work [3] on income shocks
demonstrates that alternative objective functions can result in very
different allocations, even when the broad policy goal is the same.
When allocating subsidies to households to prevent them from
experiencing adverse financial outcomes due to income shocks,
we might reasonably want to minimize the expected number of
people that will experience a certain negative financial state (a min-
sum objective function). Alternatively, we might instead reasonably
determine that we want to minimize the likelihood that the worst-
off family experiences this financial state (a min-max objective
function). Abebe et al. show that these alternative policy goals —
both wholly plausible and defensible — can result in some instances
in the exact reverse ordering of which households to prioritize for
subsidies. Formalization, then, requires us to think precisely about
what we really want when we say we want to accomplish some
goal.
Of course, just because decisions must be made about how to
formalize a problem does not mean those decisions will necessarily
be made in a transparent, accountable, or inclusive way. There are
many reasons why they may not be.
Some values may be harder to incorporate into formal models
than others, perhaps because they are difficult to quantify [43].
What we choose to incorporate into models is largely driven by
available data, and this constraint may press both scholars and
practitioners to rely on measures that elide or distort important
aspects of a situation, or that are not conducive to advocating for
broader change. Although moral considerations are often impor-
tant in determining system design, practical factors — such as the
cost savings involved in using readily-available data, rather than
gathering or generating different evidence — often play a vital role
as well [27, 28, 78].
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As a result, for stakeholders primarily committed to values that
may be ill-served by the process of formalization, the decision to
involve computing in a decision process may itself be a morally
controversial one. The opportunity that formalization poses for
constructive intervention has a negative corollary — that pragmatic
technical concerns can draw attention away from the underlying
policy goal that a model is supposed to serve. At the same time,
researchers may be able to help illuminate the constraints and biases
in existing sources of data — such as child welfare “substantiation”
outcomes, official findings of disability, or police arrest patterns —
and to underline both the importance and the expense of generating
alternative data that may be a necessary precondition for socially
responsible forecasting (e.g., [91]).
If we fail to pay attention to the question of whether our for-
mulation carefully reflects the true goals of the domain, models
can easily fall prey to inaccurate assumptions or failures of imag-
ination. In particular, the formalisms that a powerful institution
adopts to judge individual people risk focusing moral evaluation
and attention on individuals rather than on systems, a trend that
some experts have long recognized as invidious. As far back as 1979,
Donald Campbell argued that those who study public programs
“should refuse to use our skills in ad hominem research . . .We should
be evaluating not students or welfare recipients but alternative poli-
cies for dealing with their problems” [22]. More recent work has
echoed this call for an evaluative focus on systemic “interventions
over [individual] predictions” [9].
For instance, a discussion about the quality of employees in an
organization might implicitly assume that the relevant metrics for
each employee could be computed as a function of their attributes
in isolation. This approach, however, would be unable to assess
the quality of the team of employees that results, or the differing
ways in which alternative candidates might alter the team’s perfor-
mance, since a focus on individual attributes would fail to model
anything about interactions or complementarities among multiple
employees [75].
4 COMPUTING AS REBUTTAL
Computing can clarify the limits of technical interventions, and of
policies premised on them.
In a world where practitioners are tempted to pursue computa-
tional interventions, technical experts have a unique contribution to
make in illustrating the inherent limits of those approaches. Critical
reflections on the limits of computing may drive some stakeholders
— and at times, the political process as a whole — to reject compu-
tational approaches in favor of broader change. Technical experts
can be particularly well positioned to recognize and declare these
limits.
The belief that the design and deployment of computational tools
is a neutral process — and one that can be assumed to be beneficial —
may be long debunked in academic circles, but it remains a powerful
force among policymakers and the general public. When scholars of
computing recognize and acknowledge the political valence of their
technical work, they canmake it more difficult for others to leverage
computing — both practically and rhetorically — for political ends.
Technical experts can be particularly effective in contesting claims
about technologies’ capabilities and neutrality. This opportunity is
the converse of the risk that the technical research community may
“fail to recognize that the best solution to a problemmay not involve
technology” [88], and that exploration of technological approaches
may distract from broader aims.
For example: a group of computing scholars recently called on
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to reconsider its plans
to use an algorithm to assess whether a visa applicant would be-
come a “positively contributing member of society” as part of its
“Extreme Vetting” program. The experts explained that “no compu-
tational methods can provide reliable or objective assessments of
the traits that ICE seeks to measure” [5], and the program was later
abandoned [52]. Other advocates — drawing on computer science
research — have warned of the limits of natural language process-
ing tools for analyzing social media posts for purposes of “solving”
the problems of identifying fake news, removing extremist content,
or predicting propensity for radicalization. The advocates noted
that such tools are “technically infeasible” for such purposes and
advised that “policymakers must understand these limitations be-
fore endorsing or adopting automated content analysis tools” [38].
Computing scholars and practitioners can play a critical role in
advocating against inappropriate use of computational tools or
misunderstandings of what they can accomplish.
Another mode of computing as rebuttal is work that uses a for-
malization of the underlying computational problem to establish
mathematically rigorous limits on the power of algorithms to pro-
vide certain guarantees. One recent example comes from the study
of prediction algorithms for risk assessment: formal analysis has
shown that when two groups differ in their base rates for some
behavior of interest, any well-calibrated algorithm assigning prob-
abilities of this behavior to individuals must necessarily produce
differences between groups in the rate at which people are inac-
curately labeled “high-risk” or “low-risk” [25, 63]. This result thus
establishes that no matter what algorithm is employed, any way of
assigning risk estimates to two groups of differing base rates will
necessarily produce some kind of disparity in outcomes between the
groups; we cannot eliminate the problem through a better choice
of algorithm — or better process for making predictions, even those
involving human judgment. Formal results of this type can expose
the limitations of an entire category of approaches — in this case,
the assignment of risk scores to individuals — in a way that the
deficiencies of any one specific algorithm cannot.
Critiques of computing research can also illustrate the limita-
tions of existing policy frameworks. Much computational research
on fairness is built on frameworks borrowed from discrimination
law — for instance, the definition of protected categories, the 4/5ths
rule as a metric for assessing disparate impact, and, perhaps most
crucially, the belief that fairness can be achieved by simply alter-
ing how we assess people at discrete moments of decision-making
(e.g., hiring, lending, etc.) [11]. At best, discrimination law is an
incomplete mechanism to remedy historic injustices and deeply en-
trenched structures of oppression. Work on computational fairness
inherits these limitations [55]. Yet, exposing the limits of algorith-
mic notions of fairness has exposed the limits of the underlying
legal and philosophical notions of discrimination on which this
work has built. In this regard, computer science has not simply
taken normative concerns on board; it has helped to clarify and
deepen our understanding of the values at stake [54, 70, 94].
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Methods from computer science can also change how stakehold-
ers perceive a problem domain, effectively serving as a rebuttal to
entrenched policy thinking. For example, researchers who work
on matching mechanisms for refugee resettlement have argued
that by using more information about local communities — for
instance, matching refugees to places that already have a successful
cluster of earlier immigrants speaking the same language — they
can improve resettlement outcomes and in turn increase the num-
ber of refugees that communities are willing to accept [35, 60, 65].
Such steps are important because, as Robert Manduca has argued,
“many of our pressing social problems cannot be solved by better
allocating our existing sets of outcomes” [69]. In some cases, com-
puting can upend long-standing beliefs about the constraints under
which policymakers are expected to allocate a scarce resource or
opportunity. It can rebut needlessly narrow conceptualizations of
a problem, expanding the set of outcomes considered achievable
and the scope of the political debate. Conversely, by exposing the
limits of what a more optimal allocation can accomplish on its own,
computing can also help justify the non-computational changes that
are necessary for effective reform. A system for allocating scarce
housing beds may make better use of a limited stock [41], and yet
may ultimately highlight the need for more beds.3
Computing research has demonstrated the impossibility, infea-
sibility, or undesirability of proposed policies in other contexts as
well. In the area of electronic voting, more than a decade of re-
search and effort has demonstrated that secure, anonymous, and
fully electronic voting systems are infeasible with present and rea-
sonably foreseeable computer science methods. This view is now
widely understood by policymakers, and has led large numbers of
policymakers away from initial misplaced enthusiasm for paperless
high-tech voting equipment. Similarly, an authoritative consen-
sus among computing researchers about the infeasibility of secure
“backdoors” in encryption technology has played a major role in
dampening policymaker enthusiasm for broad surveillance man-
dates [4].
Using computing as a tool for rebuttal carries risks. Perhaps the
most significant is that proclamations about what a computational
tool is incapable of may focus attention on improving said tool —
which may or may not be the desired policy outcome. This risk
often accompanies critiques about inaccuracy and bias in predictive
systems: if these critiques are perceived as the system not being
(yet) “good enough” to accomplish designated policy aims well,
technical improvements to the tool may be perceived as sufficient
to address these problems. The danger, then, is that rebuttals run
the risk of transforming a policy discussion into one about what
is technically possible, rather than what social aims are ultimately
desirable.
A decade ago, Kevin Haggerty observed this exact dynamic in
debates about CCTV surveillance. The campaign against it had tried
to push back against its adoption by pointing out its lack of effi-
cacy. Haggerty noted that these debates were “insidious precisely
because they fixate exclusively on a standard of ‘functioning.’ Such
3Eubanks [41] discusses the January 2016 LA homelessness strategy report by Mayor
Eric Garcetti which benefited from a previously-implemented coordinated entry system
for allocating homelessness services in the city. This report was followed by policy
changes that increased funding for low-income housing and homelessness services.
a narrow frame ignores the prospect that the true nightmare sce-
nario might be that all of these technologies might actually work;
that they might function perfectly, with full enrollment, complete
transparency, seamless integration and exacting discriminatory
power. Indeed, when critics point out that a surveillance technol-
ogy does not work, one wonders if they would be thrilled if it did.
Rather than confronting the dystopian potentials inherent in the
maximum surveillance scenario, the political/methodological knife
fight seems to unwittingly help drive systems towards developing
ever-greater capacities” [51].
Researchers focused on the risks of facial recognition seem to
have avoided the same trap this round, raising alarm about both its
likely failures and threatening successes. Nabil Hassein was (to our
knowledge) the first to publicly observe that working to equalize
the accuracy of facial recognition across racial groups is an entirely
different undertaking than seeking to restrict the use of surveillance
based on facial recognition by law enforcement altogether [53].
The former approach addresses specific deficiencies in algorithms
used by government actors and others, while the latter argues that
the use of even a perfectly accurate facial recognition algorithm
by police would be an amplifier for oppression and injustice. On
this account, the best alternative to a bad algorithm might not be a
better algorithm — it might be no algorithm at all. Channeling these
concerns, a number of scholars published an open letter calling
on Amazon to stop selling its facial recognition technology to law
enforcement altogether [29]. Several cities in the United States have
issued bans against police use of facial recognition, with further
bans under consideration across various states, at the federal level,
and outside the United States.4
A second risk of the rebuttal approach is that focusing on what is
not possible may encourage policymakers to throw up their hands
at a problem and unduly write off computational approaches alto-
gether, when they may still have a positive role to play. Analysis
of social media posts for hate speech, for example, is impossible to
execute with complete fidelity; but it does not necessarily follow
that platforms have no responsibility to try to filter such content.
Rather, the incapabilities and imperfections of computational tools
must be objectively and pragmatically considered when evaluating
potential solutions. Scholars and practitioners engaging in com-
puting as rebuttal must be cautious against overclaiming for this
reason.
5 COMPUTING AS SYNECDOCHE
Computing can foreground long-standing social problems in a new
way.
Virginia Eubanks’s acclaimed ethnography Automating Inequal-
ity tells the stories of three automated systems used to administer
public services in different parts of the country [41]. We learn about
an attempt to automate welfare eligibility determinations in Indiana
which wreaks havoc on the lives of the state’s most vulnerable. In
Los Angeles, the county’s “coordinated entry” system ranks home-
less individuals in order to apportion the city’s limited housing
supply — treating basic human needs as resources to be strategi-
cally allocated, not rights to be ensured. And in Allegheny County,
4For an updated list of jurisdictions that have already adopted or are considering
regulations, see: https://www.policingproject.org/face-rec-all-legislation
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Pennsylvania, Eubanks tells the story of a risk model used to predict
child abuse and neglect that targets poor families for far greater
scrutiny.
Eubanks’s book draws much-needed attention to these systems.
But in discussing the book, and in the text itself, Eubanks is explicit
that her core concern is poverty, not technology. For Eubanks, com-
puting is just one mechanism through which long-standing poverty
policy is manifested. As she terms it, data analytics are “more evolu-
tion than revolution”: they’re a new instance of the tools we’ve used
for generations, built on the same notions of desert and blame that
have long characterized poverty discourse. Automated systems sit
alongside broader social policies and cultural attitudes that divert
poor people from the resources they need. Yet a technological lens
does important work for Eubanks: by framing her book through
algorithmic instantiations of poverty policy, she brings renewed
attention to the plight of the poor writ large. It’s safe to say that
Eubanks’s work has garnered more attention (and attention from
different spheres of influence) as a book about inequality through
technology than it might have if it were a book about inequality in
general.
In this way, computing acts as a synecdoche — a part that stands
in for the larger whole in discourse and critique. Computing can
offer us a tractable focus through which to notice anew, and bring
renewed attention to, old problems. This approach is not uncommon
in political discourse. Social problems are by nature complex and
multivalent; we rarely obtain purchase on a problem by focusing on
its entirety. In policymaking, we often chip away at big social issues
by concentrating on their components — and for both better and
worse, technology critique often captures public attention. Even
when we are ultimately concerned about a broader problem and see
computing as but one (and perhaps not even the most important)
facet of that problem, framing it as a technology problem may be
quite pragmatic. Such a focus can leverage resources and attention
that might not accrue otherwise. Put most bluntly, many people
would not pick up a book about poverty policy in general — but
are game to read a critique of the algorithms used to administer it.5
Jack Balkin describes this as a salience function of new technolo-
gies. He proposes that, rather than focusing entirely on technologi-
cal novelty, researchers should ask: “What elements of the social
world does a new technology make particularly salient that went
relatively unnoticed before? What features of human activity or
of the human condition does a technological change foreground,
emphasize, or problematize?” [8]. In his own analysis of the Inter-
net and free speech, Balkin emphasizes that digital technologies
“place[] freedom of speech in a new light” and “bring[] features
of the system of free expression to the forefront of our concern,
reminding us of things about freedom of expression that were al-
ways the case” [8]. In writing about Internet speech, Balkin tells us
something about characteristics of speech more generally.
The significant risk, of course, is that a focus on the techno-
logical aspects of a problem can restrict our attention to merely
those aspects. A computing lens can have the effect of masking and
pulling political capital away from other and more insidious facets
of a problem, as well as other (non-technical) means of addressing
5As Eubanks writes, the United States stands in “cultural denial” of poverty, “a social
process organized and supported by schooling, government, religion, media, and other
institutions” on both the left and the right [41].
it.6 It can also make computing something of a scapegoat; to repre-
hend computing for broad social wrongs may give us a convenient
target for outrage at systemic injustice, but in a way that does not
build momentum toward change. Further, using computing as a
synecdoche strategically exploits computing’s hegemony, but does
not, at root, challenge it — and may in fact reinforce tendencies to
center the computational dimensions of problems while dismissing
their other aspects.
Some of these tensions have recently emerged in critiques of the
labor practices that underpin the operation of algorithmic systems.
In Finland, prison laborers train a classifier on Finnish-language
business articles; the startup running the project paid the prison the
equivalent of what it would have paid Mechanical Turk workers
for the same tasks. (It is not clear what proportion of the payment
went to prisoners themselves.) Though the story was reported pre-
dominantly within tech media verticals, and the prison’s practices
decried by notable critics of technology, others noted that there
was “nothing special about AI” [23] in the story: its technological
framing was merely a new illustration of long-standing practices.
As Lilly Irani noted, “[t]he hook is that we have this kind of hype
circulating around AI” as a gloss on “really old forms of labor ex-
ploitation” [23]. Similar critiques focus on the working conditions
of human content moderators who review violent, traumatic im-
agery for very low wages, and without proper support for the
toll such work takes on their mental and physical health [47, 86].
Low-wage and exploitative work existed long before computing;
computing snaps them into focus and exacerbates them, but these
are not merely computing problems, and we should not treat them
as though they were.7
Sebastian Benthall makes a pointed critique on this theme. Chan-
neling comments by Luke Stark, Benthall explains that, while de-
bates about technology may at root be debates about capitalism,
“it’s impolite to say this because it cuts down on the urgency that
might drive political action. . . .The buzz of novelty is what gets
people’s attention” [16]. Rather than viewing a technology lens
as a pragmatic route into a broader social or economic problem,
Benthall contends that the AI ethics research community’s focus on
engineers and tech companies ultimately “serves as a moral smoke-
screen” that impedes effective critique of root problems. Benthall
notes, for example, that the emphasis on AI ethics in the critical
community is “an awkward synecdoche for the rise of major cor-
porations like Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Netflix” [15]
— and that the focus on technology rather than institutionalism or
6Eubanks laments this narrowed horizon in the context of poverty policy: “When the
digital poorhouse was born, the nation was asking difficult questions: What is our
obligation to each other in conditions of inequality? How do we reward caregiving?
How do we face economic changes wrought by automation and computerization?
The digital poorhouse reframed these big political dilemmas as mundane issues of
efficiency and systems engineering: How do we best match need to resource? How do
we eliminate fraud and divert the ineligible? How do we do the most with the least
money?” [41].
7In another labor context, concerns about automation in the workplace (of the “robots
will take all the jobs” ilk) may also represent a technological scapegoat for deeper
and more pernicious concerns about work precarity, capital accumulation, and the
demise of affordable education and the social safety net. The latest waves of workplace
automation may be exciting so much concern not because the technology is fundamen-
tally different from prior advances, but because “the programs that helped Americans
deal with how technology is always upending the job market were dismantled” [89]
(emphasis added). An overemphasis on robots obscures these broader problems and
runs the risk of diverting further political capital from them.
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political economy necessarily circumscribes the issues that can be
brought to the table.
To recognize that technology is only one component of a broader
sociopolitical system is not to give technology a free pass. The exis-
tence of a technology may help to create the conditions to support
and intensify a particular arrangement of power. Langdon Winner
described this quality as technology’s inherent compatibility with
particular sociopolitical systems (noting, for instance, that nuclear
power is inherently compatible with centralized and hierarchical
decision-making as the social “operating environment” which al-
lows the technology to function practically, whereas solar energy
may be more compatible with distributed egalitarian systems of
decision-making) [93]. Content moderation systems seem naturally
to invite exploitative labor practices based on the scale and speed
they require and the nature of the content to be moderated; the
technology does not just happen to be paired with these practices,
but is a close fit for it. A synecdochal focus on computing must
walk a pragmatic — and tenuous — line between overemphasis on
technical aspects, on one hand, and due recognition of the work
computing does to reinforce social systems, on the other.
6 CONCLUSION
Technical work on prediction and optimization in policy domains
can sometimes seem to favor slow and incremental approaches
to social change — taking a side, without necessarily intending
to, against broader and more sweeping redesigns of existing insti-
tutional arrangements. But as we have sought to show, technical
work can also operate as a constructive ally for broad social change.
In this paper, we have described four ways computing research
can support and reinforce more fundamental changes in society
and politics. Such research can help to diagnose problems, shape
through formalization the ways people understand social problems
and possibilities, illuminate the boundaries of what can and cannot
be achieved by technical means, and make long-standing prob-
lems newly salient. And it can do so in ways that are compatible
with taking less, rather than more, of today’s social landscape for
granted.
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